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Abstract 
Most people tend to equate success with merit, a tendency that is particularly pronounced among 
conservatives. However, in practice it is exceedingly difficult to discern the relative impact of luck and 
effort to economic success. Based on a large-scale online study that samples the general US popula-
tion, we investigate whether individuals misperceive the importance of luck for success, and how this 
mediates their meritocratic beliefs and acceptance of inequality. We randomly assign participants in 
pairs to compete in an easy or hard work assignment. The tasks are structured such that working on 
the easy work assignment almost certainly results in better performance and economic success. We 
show that economically successful participants overweight the role of effort in their success, perceiv-
ing high income as more deserved than unsuccessful participants. Subsequently, they demand less 
redistributive taxation, and they also show little interest in receiving information about the true de-
terminants of their success. These general findings hold true regardless of political orientation. Suc-
cessful liberals are as meritocratic as conservatives are, sharing the same beliefs in deservingness and 
preferences for low redistributive taxes. 
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1 Introduction 
People tend to accept more inequality if it reflects hard work, effort, and performance (Fong 2001; 
Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Cappelen et al. 2007; Almås, Cappelen, and Tungodden 2020). This 
widely held meritocratic fairness ideal may explain variation in income inequality and redistributive 
policies across countries (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Alesina and Angeletos 2005), and it is at the core 
of the “American Dream,” i.e. the notion that success can be attained by all who work sufficiently hard. 
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that many tend to equate success with merit (Frank 2016; 
Gauriot and Page 2019; Mijs 2019). However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern the relative 
contributions made by luck and effort to economic success. As a result, individuals may conclude in 
many cases that merit is the source of their success, when in fact luck has played a crucial role. 
This paper provides evidence on such misperceptions and their consequences for redistribu-
tive tax preferences using a large-scale interactive online study with a sample of the general popula-
tion of the United States. We are particularly interested in how economic success shapes an individ-
ual’s perception of merit and how these perceptions affect their preferences for redistributive taxa-
tion. Given that ideological dispositions on fairness views and inequality often differ between liberal 
and conservative voters and appear as critical inputs for government tax policy policies (e.g. Alesina 
and Glaeser 2004; Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan 2009), we also examine how meritocratic beliefs 
and redistributive preferences differ in relation to political orientation.  
Political affiliation is a strong indicator of how people perceive and navigate political and eco-
nomic issues (Campbell 1960; Bartels 2002). Indeed, liberals and conservatives generally adhere to 
divergent explanations of the underlying causes of economic success: in public opinion polls,  liberals 
consistently emphasize the role of luck in economic success, while conservatives typically support 
the view that success is the result of hard work, which makes any resulting inequality morally fair 
(Dunn 2018; Pew Research Center 2019).1 Yet a persistent concern is that these opinions do not nec-
essarily reflect what people think and do when they are forced to appraise their own success. Do 
liberals still believe in luck when they are successful, and are conservatives still proponents of meri-
tocracy when they are unsuccessful? 
                                                             
1 There is a handful of studies providing evidence of a correlation between political orientation and the role of 
luck and effort in economic success (see, for example, Gromet, Hartson, and Sherman 2015; Karadja, Moller-
strom, and Seim 2017; Fehr, Muller, and Preuss 2020). 
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A number of obstacles complicate the credible identification of a causal relationship between 
economic success and perceptions surrounding the role of merit and inequality acceptance. First, 
identification is complicated by the difficulty to characterize the determinants of economic success in 
observational data. It is typically hard to identify and to quantify the relative impact of luck and effort 
ex-post, let alone to study the associated beliefs. Second, it is difficult to gather data on individuals’ 
beliefs before and after they achieve economic success, and if it is possible, any observed variation in 
beliefs is likely endogenous with respect to economic success and behavior. Third, a correlation be-
tween political orientation and meritocratic beliefs may indicate that causality runs in both directions 
with political orientation informing such beliefs, and vice versa.  
We overcome these identification challenges by designing a work assignment that gives us 
control over the details of the task while also allowing us to introduce the necessary exogenous vari-
ation in economic success. The work assignment is a simple code-entry task, for which we recruited 
a large sample of workers from an online labor market platform. The code-entry task requires no 
prior knowledge or specific skills such that performance should depend almost entirely on exerted 
effort. We randomly match workers into pairs and pay them by their relative performance resulting 
in highly unequal incomes within pairs, i.e. the worker with the higher score receives a high bonus, 
whereas the worker with the lower score receives no bonus payment. To create the necessary random 
variation in economic success, we leverage the relative performance payment scheme that depends 
on exerted effort and randomly assign workers to either an easy or a hard version of the task, without 
disclosing this assignment to the workers. The two versions of the task are calibrated such that work-
ing on the easy task results with near certainty in a higher score than working on the hard task. Thus, 
while everyone has to exert effort to have a chance of success, some have a larger exogenous ad-
vantage than others – as is often the case in socioeconomic reality (e.g. Chetty et al. 2020). Further-
more, given that success is largely predetermined by one’s random assignment to the hard or easy 
task and that participants are uncertain about task difficulty, we can identify its impact on merito-
cratic beliefs, and support for redistributive taxes.  
After participants complete the work assignment, but before they learn about their success or 
failure, we elicit their beliefs about task difficulty, their relative performance, and the extent to which 
they deserve the bonus payment. After revealing the bonus payment (i.e. economic success), we meas-
ure these beliefs again. Gathering data on these perceptions both before and after disclosing the bo-
nus payment allows us to account for heterogeneous prior beliefs and to precisely measure whether 
success changes beliefs. This is important because it accounts for heterogeneity in behavior. In a next 
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step, we investigate how meritocratic beliefs shape support for redistributive taxes. Specifically, we 
elicit participants’ preferences for a redistributive tax scheme and their willingness to pay for infor-
mation about task difficulty and performance. In addition, we gather information on a broad range of 
socio-economic characteristics from participants, including political orientation and party affiliation, 
before the start of the work assignment.  
The experiment generates two main findings. First, we observe that economically successful 
participants assign excess weight to the role of effort, leading to a strong polarization in attitudes. 
That is, we document a strong treatment effect on meritocratic beliefs. Economic success leads to a 
14 percentage point higher belief that receiving the bonus payment is deserved. Similarly, successful 
participants are 16 percentage points more likely than unsuccessful participants to think that success 
in the work assignment depends on effort. Although it is very salient that success is random in our 
setting, participants predominantly attribute their success to hard work. 
Economic success in our setting also conditions preferences for redistributive taxes. Specifi-
cally, successful participants tend to prefer a lower tax rate and thus less redistribution than unsuc-
cessful participants. The difference in preferred tax rates is about 40 percentage points, equivalent to 
a three-times lower tax revenue. The difference in tax rates preferred by successful and unsuccessful 
participants can be fully explained by their prior beliefs regarding merit. That is, participants with a 
higher prior belief that they deserve the bonus payment demand less redistribution (i.e. a lower tax 
rate) when they are successful, but more redistribution if they are unsuccessful.  
Consistent with the relationship between perceptions of personal merit and preferred tax 
rates, we document that a significant share of participants are highly willing to remain in the dark 
about the relative importance of merit for their success. About 50 percent of participants are unwill-
ing to forego even 1 cent to obtain information regarding task difficulty, the main determinant of eco-
nomic success. Moreover, the willingness to pay for this piece of information is significantly lower for 
successful than for unsuccessful participants, indicating that individuals are more than willing to 
maintain false perceptions about the causes of their success, misperceptions that justify greater ine-
quality. 
Second, the findings bring empirical evidence to the divisive political debate regarding fair-
ness views and economic issues. In particular, we cast doubt on the broadly held notion that liberals 
are less likely to equate success with merit than conservatives. In fact, when liberals are economically 
successful, they advocate meritocracy just as frequently as conservatives, despite the overwhelming 
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role played by luck in our setting. In other words, meritocratic beliefs and behavior do not differ by 
political orientation: when they are successful, liberals and conservatives both identify merit as the 
cause of success, and they both prefer lower redistributive taxes. Moreover, liberals assign as little 
importance to learning about the role of luck in their success as conservatives, they are less likely to 
revise their tax preferences, and if they revise them, the magnitude of change is smaller when com-
pared to that of conservatives.  
The findings of our paper contribute to several strands in the literature. Most importantly, we 
add to the voluminous literature on fairness preferences and fairness views. An important and con-
sistent finding that has emerged in observational studies (Fong 2001; Alesina and Angeletos 2005; 
Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim 2017) and laboratory studies alike (Konow 2000; Cappelen et al. 
2013; Cappelen et al. 2017) is that people tend to accept greater inequality if it is the result of effort 
rather than luck. While the importance of the source of inequality is well documented, empirical evi-
dence on inequality acceptance when individuals are uncertain or have limited information about the 
source of inequality is scarce (but see, for example, Cappelen et al. 2017; Cappelen, De Haan, and 
Tungodden 2020). Unlike most of these papers, however, we present causal evidence on how eco-
nomic success impacts meritocratic beliefs when individuals are able to ascribe their success to their 
own actions. The selfish behavior that we observe is consistent with self-serving fairness norms de-
scribed in the prior literature (Babcock et al. 1995; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Croson and Konow 
2009; Konow 2009; Cappelen et al. 2013; Durante, Putterman, and van der Weele 2014; Deffains, 
Espinosa, and Thöni 2016). We advance this literature by showing that participants display little in-
terest in correcting biased views about merit. We also show that this lack of interest applies to liberals 
and conservatives alike.  
Our paper belongs to a growing literature in economics that documents political polarization 
on a host of social and economic issues. Recent studies show that this polarization is not confined to 
political attitudes or fairness views alone (e.g. Gromet, Hartson, and Sherman 2015; Cappelen et al. 
2020), but also applies to perceptions of factual reality, including inequality (Kuziemko et al. 2015), 
relative income (Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013; Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim 2017; Fehr, 
Mollerstrom, and Perez-Truglia 2019), social mobility (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso 2018; Fehr, Mul-
ler, and Preuss 2020), and immigration (Alesina, Miano, and Stantcheva 2020; Grigorieff, Roth, and 
Ubfal 2020). Other studies suggest that liberals tend to be less accepting of inequality (Fisman, Jakiela, 
and Kariv 2017; Cappelen, Haaland, and Tungodden 2019; Almås, Cappelen, and Tungodden 2020). 
While we find that liberals are more open to redistributive taxation, and are thus less accepting of 
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inequality, we find no difference in how liberals and conservatives react to economic success – that 
is, liberals display the same meritocratic beliefs and behavior as conservatives.  
Finally, we contribute to a rapidly growing strand of economic research that relies on online 
platforms such as MTurk, Prolific, Dynata, Luc.id, and YouGov. The vast majority of these studies use 
such platforms to implement surveys and survey experiments (e.g. Kuziemko et al. 2015; Weinzierl 
2017; Grigorieff, Roth, and Ubfal 2020) or decision tasks and one-shot experiments (e.g. Bordalo et 
al. 2016; De Quidt, Haushofer, and Roth 2018; DellaVigna and Pope 2018b, 2018a; Enke and Graeber 
2019; Exley and Kessler 2019; Gagnon, Bosmans, and Riedl 2020). Our study combine these elements 
and demonstrates the feasibility of conducting large-scale interactive experiments using an online 
platform (see also Arechar, Gächter, and Molleman 2018; Molleman et al. 2019). We discuss the im-
plementation of the experiment in Section 2 below, and also provide practical advice on conducting 
successful interactive online experiments. 
2 Experimental Design 
Our study, which combines a survey and incentivized decision tasks, consists of four parts: a socio-
demographic questionnaire, a work assignment, a redistribution task, and an information acquisition 
task.2 We pre-registered the design and a pre-analysis plan in the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-
0004455).  
Setup: In the first part, we introduce participants to the general details of the study and ask for their 
consent. We then elicit some basic socio-demographic information and personality traits. More de-
tails and a complete list of all covariates can be found in Appendix A1. In the second part, participants 
work on a real effort task for 3 minutes. The task consists of retyping a series of randomly generated 
sequences of upper- and lower-case letters. There are two task types: An easy task consisting of five-
letter sequences and a hard task consisting of 15-letter sequences. We informed participants that 
there are two task types and that they would be randomly assigned to one of the two (treatment as-
signment). While participants know that the easy task involves shorter sequences and the hard task 
involves longer sequences, they are not told the exact number of letters in each task type, thus engen-
dering uncertainty about their task assignment. We intentionally designed the tasks to ensure diver-
gence between participant scores based on task assignment, rather than participant skill or effort. 
                                                             
2 Screenshots of the survey and all tasks are available in the Appendix. 
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Specifically, due to the length of the sequences, participants in the hard task will retype fewer se-
quences than participants assigned to the easy task (see Section 4.1 for more details).  
Participants are paid according to their performance. That is, we randomly match a partici-
pant working on the easy task with a participant working on the hard task and compare their scores. 
The participant with the higher score receives a bonus payment of $2 and the participant with the 
lower score receives $0. Note that the matching protocol is public knowledge, i.e. participants are 
uncertain about the difficulty of their task, but know their matching partner is doing the other task 
(whether hard or easy). 
Before we reveal the outcome of the performance comparison (i.e. the bonus payment), we 
ask participants: (1) to estimate the likelihood that they worked through the hard task (“Prior Belief, 
Task Difficulty”), (2) how much they think they deserve the $2 -bonus payment (“Prior Belief, Deserv-
ing Bonus”), and (3) to estimate how many of 100 participants performing the same task achieve a 
lower score (“Prior Belief, Relative Performance”). After revealing the bonus payment, we ask the 
same questions again (“Posterior Beliefs”). Additionally, we ask participants to assess the extent to 
which they think the bonus payment depends on luck or effort (“Belief Effort Determines Success”). 
Building on evidence suggesting that complex incentivation rules do not outperform introspection 
(e.g. Trautmann and van de Kuilen 2015; Charness, Gneezy, and Rasoscha 2020; Danz, Vesterlund, 
and Wilson 2020), we do not remunerate the elicitation of these beliefs in order to avoid complicating 
the tasks and to keep the study within a reasonable time frame. 
In the third part, both participants in the matched pair have to decide about a redistributive 
tax rate, in which the tax revenue is equally distributed between the pair. This implies in our setting 
that the successful participant pays half of the tax revenue as tax while the unsuccessful participant 
receives half of the tax revenue. Using an interactive slider, participants can indicate a tax rate (“Tax 
Rate”) between 0% and 100% and immediately see how the tax rate will affect their income and that 
of the other person. We randomly select one of the two proposed tax rates and apply the choice to the 
matched pair at the end of the study.3 
In the fourth part, we offer participants an opportunity to buy information about task diffi-
culty and the task performance of the other participant. We elicit their willingness to pay (“WTP”) for 
                                                             
3 Note that this procedure elicits participants’ true preferences for redistributive taxation given that partici-
pants are consequentialists and care about final outcomes. This assumption seems reasonable in our setting as 
merit considerations typically overlay ex-ante fairness concerns (Cappelen et al. 2013; Durante, Putterman, and 
van der Weele 2014; Cappelen et al. 2017).  
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this information with a simple price list. In this price list, we present participants with eight scenarios 
in which they have to decide between seeing the information or receiving extra money, with amounts 
ranging from $0.01 to $0.50. For instance, in Scenario 1 they have to choose between seeing infor-
mation and receiving $0.01, and in Scenario 8 they have to choose between seeing information and 
receiving $0.50. To incentivize participants, we randomly pick one of the eight scenarios for each par-
ticipant and implement their choice in this scenario. That is, a participant will either receive the in-
formation immediately after the price-list decision or receive the extra money at the end of the survey. 
In a last step, all participants who have received the information and a random subset of the remain-
ing participants (50%) have the opportunity to revise their tax rate (“Revised Tax Rate”). Note that 
we only implement the revised tax rate if the first tax proposal from that participant was initially 
chosen for implementation. Finally, participants receive a detailed overview about the composition 
of their final payout. 
Implementation: We used the open source software oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016) to 
program and run the study. We recruited and paid participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
This platform offers access to a quite diverse population (e.g. Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2011; 
Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011; Arechar, Kraft-Todd, and Rand 2017) and mounting evidence 
suggests that the findings of studies run on MTurk are robust to results using other subject popula-
tions, such as student, convenience, and nationally representative samples (e.g. Horton, Rand, and 
Zeckhauser 2011; Arechar, Gächter, and Molleman 2018; Coppock and McClellan 2019; Snowberg and 
Yariv 2020). However, some researchers have noted that data quality has recently declined, in par-
ticular due to automated responses (bots) and inattention (Ahler, Roush, and Sood 2020; 
Chmielewski and Kucker 2020). To address these concerns, we took several precautionary measures. 
First, we limited participation to MTurkers based in the US with more than 1000 performed Human 
Intelligence Tasks (HITs) and an acceptance rate of at least 98%. Second, we used a simplified CAP-
TCHA (adding two numbers) to screen for bots, i.e. only participants that correctly answered this 
question could access our survey. Third, the letter sequences in the work assignment were in non-
machine-readable format, providing another layer of protection against bots.   
We also took great care to address other practical challenges associated with running experi-
ments on an online platform such as MTurk. First, MTurkers often multitask and work simultaneously 
on several HITs. To minimize inattention due to switching between HITs, we requested in the begin-
ning that participants should exclusively work on our HIT, and stated that they have a total of 20 
minutes to complete the HIT, that there are timeouts on each question, and that any payment is 
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conditional on completing the HIT within the time limit. The timeouts are set such that participants 
have sufficient time to thoughtfully answer our questions, yet they must remain attentive. Moreover, 
we paid a relatively high flat payment of $0.75 and promised substantial additional payments. On 
average, participants earned about $1.90, which is substantially above the US minimum wage consid-
ering our usual HIT duration of 12 minutes.  
Second, since participants typically do not arrive simultaneously, we designed the experiment 
such that the survey and the work assignment can be completed independently. There was, however, 
one important exception. To determine the bonus payment, it is necessary to compare two partici-
pants’ performances in the real-effort task. For this reason, every participant entered a virtual waiting 
room before the announcement of the bonus payment. If a suitable matching partner was already 
waiting, participants were immediately matched and each could independently work through the rest 
of the survey. If there was no matching partner available, participants had to wait for a minimum of 
three minutes. As soon as a suitable matching partner arrived in the waiting room, they were 
matched. Participants had the possibility to end the survey after three minutes (if no suitable match-
ing partner had arrived), in which case they only received the base payment. Alternatively, they could 
continue waiting until they were matched (but they ran the risk of exceeding the HIT time limit, in 
which case they received no payment).  
Finally, we aimed to minimize the risk of participants dropping out before completing the sur-
vey. Despite numerous possibilities for dropping out voluntarily or involuntarily (e.g. if no matching 
partner is available), internal validity is only threatened by dropouts after the announcement of the 
bonus payment (which depends on the random task assignment). As long as such dropouts are ran-
dom across the treatment, our treatment estimates remain unbiased (as it is the case, as shown be-
low). However, we also took some steps to minimize this risk ex-ante. We informed participants that 
they would not receive any payment and no HIT approval if they dropped out due to a time out. Evi-
dence suggests that these are sensible requirements, as MTurkers are sensitive to rejections (a low 
approval rate prevents them from participating in HITs that require a high approval rate; see Hara et 
al. (2018). 
Attrition and sample characteristics: The overall attrition rate was about 9 percent, which is com-
paratively low for this type of study.4 In total, 2,026 participants started the work assignment and 
                                                             
4 For example, Kuziemko et al. (2015) report an attrition rate of 15 percent in survey experiment and Arechar, 
Gächter, and Molleman (2018) report an attrition rate of 18 percent in an interactive online experiment. 
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1,845 participants finished all tasks.5 Importantly, attrition was random across the treatment assign-
ment (10 percent in the hard and 8 percent in the easy task, t-test, p=0.25). The low level of attrition 
illustrates the effectiveness of the implemented measures to minimize dropouts and suggests that the 
treatment assignment did not cause participants to quit our HIT. A regression of an indicator for drop-
outs on the treatment indicator shows no difference in the likelihood of attrition between the easy 
and hard treatment (see Appendix Table A1).6 Moreover, comparing socio-demographic characteris-
tics (including political views) of dropouts and non-dropouts reveals no differences (see Appendix 
Table A2). Across 30 tests, there is no single t-statistic above 1.96. Therefore, attrition is unlikely to 
affect our results.  
In our final sample, we dropped 20 participants, because they ended up with the same score 
and the bonus was split equally within pairs. This leaves us with 1,825 observations. In Appendix 
Table A3, we show that the participants do not differ along a large set of observables in the two tasks. 
A joint test for all observables being equal to zero reveals an F-statistic of 1.09 (p=0.35). Moreover, 
comparing our MTurk sample with data from the US census reveals remarkable similarities along a 
large set of observables. Our sample closely matches the US population in terms of age, gender, mar-
ital status, household size and income, and geographic location, but white and educated people are 
overrepresented (see Appendix Table A4).  
3 Empirical Strategy 
Our treatment involves the random assignment of participants to the easy and hard task. Participants 
know at the outset that they will be assigned to one of the two tasks with equal probability and that 
they will be randomly matched to a participant completing the other task. Importantly, they do not 
learn and cannot infer the difficulty of the task from the task itself. We calibrated the difficulty of the 
two tasks such that the participant assigned to the easy task can easily outperform his or her counter-
part assigned to the hard task. Consequently, economic success (i.e. receiving the $2 bonus payment) 
                                                             
5 A total of 2,535 MTurkers accepted our HIT. Of those, 383 failed on the simple CAPTCHA, which served as a 
first robot control, and 105 did not finish the demographics survey. Our work assignment served as a second 
robot control as we displayed the tasks in non-machine-readable format and 21 MTurkers dropped out after 
the survey but before the work assignment resulting in our final sample of 2,026. 
6 The coefficient for the treatment indicator is -0.015 (s.e. 0.013). The same is true if we run the same regression 
but only consider dropouts after participants learned about the bonus assignment (coefficient -0.013, s.e. 
0.009). 
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should coincide with the random assignment to the easy task. This allows us to identify the causal 
effect of economic success on meritocratic beliefs and behavior.  
In practice, treatment compliance was, however, not perfect. About 6 percent of participants 
assigned to the hard task had a better performance than their matched counterparts in the easy task 
(for details, see Section 4.1). To deal with this non-compliance, we use the treatment assignment (easy 
or hard task) to estimate intention-to-treat (ITT) effects. The general regression framework thus takes 
the following form: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  is one of our outcome variables (i.e. our belief measures and the tax rate), 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 indi-
cates if a participant was randomly assigned to the easy task, 𝑿𝑿 is a set of standard controls (including 
gender, age, marital status, education level, ethnicity, employment status, and household income), 
and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is an individual-specific error term. In some specifications, we consider participants’ political 
views by including its interaction with the treatment. For this purpose, we asked participants about 
their political orientation ranging from “strongly liberal” to “strongly conservative” (on a 6-point 
scale) and classify them as liberal if they indicate that they are “strongly liberal”, “moderately liberal” 
or “slightly liberal.”7 We run OLS regressions, use robust standard errors, and estimate (1) with and 
without controls.  
Because non-compliance is low, we report ITT estimates throughout the paper, and relegate 
and discuss the IV estimates (effects of the treatment on the treated) to Online Appendix A5. These 
estimates are similar in magnitude to the ITT estimates. Therefore, we interpret our results reported 
below as the effect of the bonus assignment or economic success. We pre-specified the analysis in our 
pre-analysis plan (AEARCTR-0004455) and we follow this plan if not stated otherwise.  
4 Results 
Our aim is to explore whether economic success affects how people think about the role of merit and 
whether it affects inequality acceptance (i.e. participants’ attitudes toward redistributive taxation). 
We present three sets of results. First, we document participants’ perception about merit in the work 
assignment and examine how these perceptions change with the exogenous bonus assignment 
                                                             
7 We also asked participants about their party affiliation (Republican, Democrat, other). Our results do not 
change if we use this information or a combination of both questions in our analysis.  
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Second, we examine how perceptions of merit affect redistributive choices. Third, we are interested 
in participants’ willingness to learn about the underlying determinant of their success. 
4.1 Work Assignment and Prior Beliefs 
We start by looking at participants’ performance in the two tasks. Table 1 provides an overview. It is 
apparent that, on average, participants in the easy task coded substantially more sequences of letters 
compared to participants in the hard task (35 vs. 10). However, as indicated above, the scores in the 
two tasks overlap to some extent. That is, the 90th percentile in the hard task is 17, while the 10th 
percentile in the easy task is 16. This overlap results in a non-compliance to the treatment assignment 
in about 6 percent of cases, because the bonus is paid to a participant completing the hard task, in-
stead of the participant performing the easy task.  
Figure 1 shows participants’ beliefs regarding task difficulty, their deservingness of the bonus, 
and their relative performance prior to the announcement of the bonus payment. As shown in the 
figure, actually performing the task was a weak signal of task difficulty, as intended. Nevertheless, 
participants had some notion of their task assignment: 67.9 percent of participants in the hard task 
thought they had been assigned to the hard task, which is significantly above 50 percent (p < 0.001, 
two-sided t-test). Similarly, 62.8 percent of participants in the easy task thought they had been as-
signed to the easy task. Again, this is significantly different from chance (p < 0.001, two-sided t-test).  
At the same time, we observe that participants in the easy task find themselves as more de-
serving of the $2 bonus compared to participants in the hard task (75.2 percent vs. 71.9 percent, p < 
0.05, two-sided t-test). This is notable, as it suggests that performance (i.e. coding a larger number of 
sequences) creates a perception that one worked hard and thus deserves a bonus. Indeed, perfor-
mance and perceptions of deservingness are strongly correlated (each point increase in performance 
increases beliefs in deservingness by approximately 0.28 percentage points; see Figure A1). In line 
with this finding, we observe that coding more sequences, on average, is related to the impression 
that one ranks higher in the performance distribution. Specifically, participants in the easy task 
thought they outperformed 54 percent of other participants completing the same task, whereas par-
ticipants in the hard task thought they were better than 52 percent of those completing the hard task. 
Although this difference is small, it is statistically significant (p < 0.05, two-sided t-test). Interestingly, 
political views are not related to beliefs about deservingness and performance. That is, these beliefs 
do not differ between liberals and conservatives. 
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4.2 Effects on Posterior Beliefs 
Figure 2 displays the difference between posterior and prior beliefs and thus illustrates how eco-
nomic success (i.e. bonus assignment) changes beliefs. Notably, the bonus announcement does not 
change perceptions of task difficulty. However, we observe that bonus announcement results in sig-
nificant changes in perceived deservingness and relative performance. We see that economic success 
increases perceived merit by 5 percentage points, while at the same time, failure decreases perceived 
merit by almost 6 percentage points. This further increases the wedge in merit perceptions between 
successful and unsuccessful participants. Economic success results in a 14 percentage point higher 
belief that receiving the bonus payment is deserved.  
Similarly, success increases belief in relative performance but decreases it for those who are 
left empty-handed. Participants in the easy task think their performance is better than 60 percent of 
others, while participants in the hard task think their performance is only better than 47 percent of 
others. This suggests that being successful also triggers overconfidence. Indeed, if we compare how 
participants’ posterior beliefs about relative performance compare to their true rank in the perfor-
mance distribution of all participants completing the same task, we see a higher share of overconfi-
dent participants in the easy task than in the hard task (0.59 vs. 0.46; t-test, p<0.01). This is not the 
case before the bonus announcement, i.e. if we compare prior beliefs about relative performance to 
the true rank. In this case, the share of overconfident participants in the easy task is nearly the same 
as in the hard task (0.52 vs. 0.50; t-test, p<0.37).  
Table 2 presents rigorous statistical evidence on how economic success impacts these per-
ceptions. We regress the difference between posterior and prior beliefs on a treatment indicator, par-
ticipants’ political beliefs, and its interaction with the treatment indicator. To compare the results 
from this exercise with the observed patterns in the raw data we include a specification without po-
litical beliefs and covariates. There are several things to note. First, it is apparent that the regressions 
confirm the results presented above. Receiving the bonus has no effect on the perceived task diffi-
culty, while it increases participants’ perceptions that they deserve the bonus and that they per-
formed better than others. Second, one can see in columns 3, 6, and 9 that controlling for participants 
demographic and economic status (such as gender, age, education, income, household size, ethnicity, 
employment status, marital status, and geographic indicators) does not meaningfully affect the esti-
mated treatment effects. Third, political views are largely unrelated to changes in beliefs. In 
 
13 
particular, we observe equally strong feelings of deserving the bonus among liberals and conserva-
tives, and they do not differ in their perceptions of task difficulty.  
Overall, our treatment resulted in strong effects on beliefs. Most notably, there is a sizable 
impact on perceptions of deservingness that is independent of political views.  
4.3 Behavioral Measure: Redistributive Taxes 
We now address how misperceptions of economic success translate into tax preferences. Panel a. of 
Figure 3 shows a strong divergence of tax rates across the two conditions: the average tax rate in the 
easy task is about 20.6 percent and in the hard task about 60.2 percent. Despite this divergence, it is 
apparent that fairness considerations matter. That is, tax rates are far from the extremes of no and 
full redistribution. In Table 3, we present regressions showing how success and failure shape redis-
tributive tax-rate decisions. The first column confirms that the proposed tax rate is about 40 percent-
age points lower if participants received the $2 bonus. This effect is substantial and corresponds to a 
3-times lower tax revenue. Including covariates does not change the estimate (column 2).  
Next, we examine the relationship between tax-rate decisions and political views using pre-
treatment information on participants’ self-assessment in the political left-right spectrum. Panel b. of 
Figure 3 illustrates that economic circumstances affect redistributive preferences irrespective of po-
litical views: conservatives and liberals prefer high taxes if they are unsuccessful whereas they both 
choose low taxes if they are successful. However, it is also true that liberals propose, on average, 
higher tax rates than conservatives. Specifically, the difference in tax rates is about 8 percentage 
points in the hard task (t-test, p<0.01), while it is about 3 percentage points in the easy task (t-test, 
p<0.06). While this finding echoes correlational evidence that liberal voters are more favorable to-
ward taxation (Wahlund 1992; Reed 2006; Hardisty, Johnson, and Weber 2010), the differences are 
small, particularly among those who are successful. 
Following our pre-analysis plan, we corroborate these findings using a similar regression 
specification as above. In Table 3, column 3, we observe that, on average, liberals demand more re-
distribution, and thus set a higher tax rate than conservatives. Interacting treatment status with po-
litical views, we find a negative and statistically insignificant effect, which corresponds to roughly half 
of the difference between liberals and conservatives in the hard task. That is, while liberals tend to 
set higher tax rates than conservatives, the difference in the easy task is substantially smaller than in 
the hard task. Again, adding covariates does not change the coefficient estimates (columns 4 and 6).  
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4.4 Impact of Beliefs on Redistributive Taxes 
Differences in tax preferences between liberals and conservatives are often associated with differ-
ences in beliefs about the role of effort in economic success. Liberals tend to assign luck a greater role 
in economic success than effort, while conservatives believe that effort dominates (Gromet, Hartson, 
and Sherman 2015; Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim 2017; Fehr, Muller, and Preuss 2020). Indeed, 
when asking participants whether they think economic success is the result of luck or effort, liberals 
are less likely to believe the bonus payment is the result of effort (see Table 2 columns 11 and 12).8 
This finding accords with liberals’ “locus of control”: that is, liberals are more likely to believe life 
outcomes are the result of fate or luck, and therefore beyond one’s control (see Appendix Table A8). 
However, the correlation between locus of control (LoC) and political orientation is not strong, and 
we find that LoC itself has no impact on tax rate preferences. In the Appendix Table A9, we regress 
the tax rate on our treatment, LoC, and the interaction of the two and find no measurable effect of LoC 
on tax rate preferences. 
To shed light on the factors underlying tax-rate decisions, we examine how they relate to be-
liefs. We are particularly interested in the heterogeneity with respect to prior beliefs about the task. 
All beliefs (except beliefs that effort determines success) were elicited before the bonus announce-
ment and thus reflect heterogeneity in beliefs that are unaffected by the bonus announcement. We 
include these perceptions about the work assignment one-by-one in the regressions and additionally 
control for a full set of covariates. Table 4 presents the results and reproduces, for comparison, the 
treatment effect on taxation in columns 1–2. In line with the previous literature, we find that a 
stronger belief that effort determines success reduces tax rates in both conditions (column 3). That 
is, participants are less willing to redistribute if they more strongly believe that the bonus is the result 
of hard work.  
Examining heterogeneous effects offers a more nuanced picture of possible mechanisms, even 
though we observe in all specifications that beliefs are related to the tax-rate decision. We first note 
that beliefs about task difficulty are positively related to taxes in the case of failure, while they are 
negatively related when successful (column 4). That is, in both treatments we see that participants 
who are more certain about task difficulty react more strongly by demanding more (hard task) and 
                                                             
8 The regression also reveals that in both tasks, participants believe that effort is more important than luck for 
success. However, the results in Table 1, column 10 highlight a strong disparity: successful participants believe 
to a much greater extent than unsuccessful participants that receiving the bonus is attributable to effort (16-
percentage-point difference). 
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less taxes (easy task), respectively. There is a similar pattern for relative performance beliefs (column 
5). Believing in stronger performance is associated with demanding a larger share of the pie, i.e. be-
liefs are positively related to taxes for economically unsuccessful participants and negatively related 
to taxes for the successful. Importantly, in both cases we observe a large and significant treatment 
effect.  
In contrast to these observations, the treatment effect is no longer significant when we include 
beliefs about deservingness. The regressions in column 6 reveal that a higher belief in deserving the 
bonus payment is associated with a higher tax rate for unsuccessful participants, but not for success-
ful participants. More precisely, a 1 percentage point higher belief in deserving the bonus payment is 
associated with a 0.23 percentage point higher tax rate for unsuccessful participants, but a 0.44 per-
centage point lower tax rate for successful participants. Given the effect size of the interaction term, 
the joint effect with prior beliefs is negative and significant as well (Wald test, p<0.01). This suggests 
that the treatment effect is mediated by the belief that success is an indicator of deservingness.  
4.5 Willingness to Correct Beliefs 
Thus far, we have shown that receiving the bonus caused a shift in perceived deservingness of the 
bonus and in beliefs about the role of effort for success. This shift in beliefs explains the substantial 
disparity in the willingness to redistribute, with successful participants proposing a lower tax rate 
than unsuccessful participants. Recall that we randomly assigned participants to the easy and hard 
task and that they only learned whether they received the $2 bonus or not, but neither received in-
formation on which task they completed, nor the score of their opponent. This uncertainty in relation 
to task difficulty and performance allows participants to maintain distorted and self-serving beliefs 
about whether they deserve the bonus.  
In a next step, we therefore examine whether participants are willing to pay for information 
that would allow them to update their beliefs about task difficulty and thus to verify their perceptions 
about the role of luck in success. We elicited participants’ willingness to pay (WTP) with the help of 
an incentivized price list in the last part of the survey. That is, participants had to choose between 
receiving an additional sum (which varied between 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, 35, and 50 cents) or information 
about the difficulty of the completed task and the score of their opponent.  
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Figure 4 shows the distribution of participants’ WTP with consistent answers, separated by 
task.9 It is apparent that in both tasks a significant share of the participants are not interested in the 
information and always opt for the money (46 percent in the hard task and 52 percent in the easy 
task) and that WTP is lower in the easy task. At the same time, there is a sizable share of participants 
who are interested in learning about task difficulty. In Table 5, we use interval regressions to provide 
statistical support for these observations. Column 1 reveals that the average WTP in the hard task is 
about 7.4 cents, and about 1 cent lower in the easy task, a 14 percent lower WTP. Adding controls in 
column 2 leaves the coefficient of the treatment variable nearly unchanged. Moreover, we see that 
political views play no role in willingness to obtain information: liberals and conservatives display a 
similar willingness to pay. These findings suggest that participants are more likely to prefer remain-
ing ignorant when they are successful, possibly to maintain their meritocratic beliefs, and this applies 
to liberals and conservatives in equal degree. 
Next, we examine whether obtaining information about task difficulty and the opponents’ 
score leads to revised tax-rate preferences. All participants who received the information (approx. 25 
percent) and a random subset of the remaining participants (approx. 50 percent) had the possibility 
to revise their tax decision. This results in a sample of N=1,130. In a slight deviation from our pre-
analysis plan, we look here at the likelihood of participants changing the tax rate and the magnitude 
of change. In all regression specifications, we control for WTP as participants with a higher WTP have 
a higher probability of receiving the information. In other words, receiving information is only ran-
dom after conditioning on WTP. Table 6 displays the results. Conditional on WTP, receiving infor-
mation increases the likelihood of revising the tax rate by 27 percent. However, once we control for 
treatment status and political views (including a full set of interactions) the coefficient estimate be-
comes substantially smaller and insignificant. Instead, we see that the likelihood of revising the tax 
rate is lower for liberals (columns 3 and 4). Columns 5–8 present the effects on the magnitude of 
change. Again, we see that receiving information leads to larger changes in the tax rate than not re-
ceiving information. Controlling for treatment status and political views indicates that changes are 
                                                             
9 As is typically the case with this procedure, a few participants displayed inconsistent behavior by switching 
multiple times between buying information and keeping the offered amount of money. The share of inconsistent 
participants is 3 percent, which is at the lower end of the range observed in other papers using a similar proce-
dure. For example, Fehr, Mollerstrom, and Perez-Truglia (2019) and Fuster, Perez-Truglia, and Zafar (2018) 
report 5 percent inconsistent choices, whereas Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2018) report 15 percent. Note that 
the low rate of inconsistent answers also speaks to the attentiveness of participants. 
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smaller in the easy task and for liberals irrespective of treatment status, while the coefficient on re-
ceived information is less precisely estimated.  
Together, these results suggest that participants in the easy task want to maintain their meri-
tocratic beliefs to justify their tax decision, and this tendency is particularly pronounced among lib-
erals.  
4.6 Exploratory Analysis: Impact of Correcting Misperceptions on Behavior 
Given the variation in beliefs about task difficulty, the impact of information disclosure may differ 
substantially across participants. For example, a participant who is relatively certain about having 
worked on the hard task will not be too surprised to learn that she was in fact assigned to the hard 
task, thus making her less likely revise her tax-rate decision. To capture this effect and to account for 
the fact that a subset of participants received no information and therefore could not update their 
beliefs, we estimate the following regression model:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 ∙ �100 − 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� ∙ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∙ �100 − 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� + 𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑿𝑿 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  is an indicator for revising the tax rate (or not), or the absolute value of the change in the tax 
rate. 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  is the posterior belief about task difficulty and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  is a binary variable, indicating 
whether a participant received information or not. The parameter of interest is 𝛽𝛽1, which shows the 
causal effect (conditional on WTP) of receiving information on task difficulty, i.e. the effect of learning 
that the likelihood of being in the hard/easy task is 1 percentage point higher than previously thought. 
The variable �100 − 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� controls for non-random variation in misperceptions about the task 
difficulty, which ensures that 𝛽𝛽1 is identified by random variation in receiving information about task 
difficulty. This analysis is exploratory, as we did not specify it in our pre-analysis plan.  
In Table 7, column 1, we see that the information shock has no effect on the likelihood of 
changing the tax rate. The coefficient is close to zero and precisely estimated. Controlling for treat-
ment status (column 3) reveals that participants in the easy task are less likely to revise the tax rate, 
which is in line with the estimates in Table 6. This negative effect on taxes is only present among 
conservatives (column 5), but not among liberals (column 4) when controlling for the news shock 
(𝛽𝛽1). In contrast to these results, the information shock has a significant and positive effect on the size 
of the tax revisions. Learning that the task difficulty is 10 percentage point higher than previously 
thought results in a 5 percentage point larger change in tax rate (column 6). This is sizable given that 
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the average bias is about 33 percentage points. Adding covariates in column 7 and controlling for 
treatment status in column 8 leaves the coefficient estimate for information unchanged. If we differ-
entiate between political views, we see that liberals drive this effect. They react strongly to the infor-
mation shock (column 9), while conservatives do not react at all (column 10). To summarize, the in-
formation shock has no influence on the decision to revise the tax, but if participants revise their tax 
rate, changes are larger for liberals who experienced a larger information shock. 
5 Discussion 
We conducted a large-scale online experiment to investigate how “randomness” in economic success 
affects meritocratic beliefs and redistributive preferences when participants have an opportunity to 
“mentally” justify their success by attributing it to their own effort. Our results demonstrate that ex-
periencing economic success or failure leads to a significant divergence in meritocratic beliefs and 
inequality acceptance. Successful participants believe they are more deserving of the bonus and de-
mand substantially lower tax rates than unsuccessful participants.  
Participants are well aware of the random assignment to one of two tasks that differ in diffi-
culty. Therefore, it is very salient for matched participants that one of them has an easier path to 
success. Meritocratic principles would call for redistribution in such a situation, as circumstances are 
beyond one’s control (e.g. Cappelen et al. 2007). At the same time, however, participants have an in-
centive to reap the full material benefits of their success. This conflict between self-interest and fair-
ness principles may result in cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). To reduce this tension, people 
may follow different strategies: one may reduce self-interested behavior, or, alternatively, engage in 
self-deceptive behavior by manipulating their own beliefs (Konow 2000).  
The latter strategy appears to be visible in our data, as participants adapt their beliefs to rec-
oncile their wish for maximizing outcomes with the wish for a fair outcome. This is evident based on 
the share of successful participants who believe they deserve the bonus, which increases substantially 
in the easy task after the bonus announcement. Moreover, it is in accordance with their belief that 
effort determines success. Consequently, to resolve this cognitive dissonance, participants try to up-
hold their beliefs in a self-serving manner (Loewenstein et al. 1993). This may also explain why par-
ticipants in the easy task have a lower willingness-to-pay for information about task difficulty and 
score of the other participant. Köszegi (2006) refers to this the “self-image protection motive,” which 
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impels individuals to avoid information that might distort existing beliefs. That participants have a 
fairly good sense of the difficulty of the task they performed is indicative of the strength of this motive. 
There is widespread support for meritocratic principles in modern societies. Indeed, few 
would disagree that people should be able to climb the ladder of success and reap its associated re-
wards, if they only work hard enough. Against the backdrop of rising inequality, it is therefore unsur-
prising that academics, policymakers and voters have repeatedly called for greater equality of oppor-
tunity to achieve this ideal. Nevertheless, in most countries, reality diverges sharply from the merito-
cratic ideal. Social mobility within the United States, for example, is among the lowest across devel-
oped countries, in no small part due to inequality of opportunity (Corak 2006; Chetty et al. 2014; 
Chetty et al. 2017). These unequal opportunities are particularly pronounced in the college admission 
process. The most selective colleges in the US, which also offer the best earning prospects, predomi-
nantly enroll students from affluent families. Indeed, the share of students at elite colleges coming 
from families in the top 1% of the income distribution is higher than the share from the bottom 50% 
(Chetty et al. 2020). Given the strong correlation between college affiliation and income, some indi-
viduals clearly have a much easier route to success than others. Our setting seeks to replicate this 
uneven playing field. Although the conditions of unequal opportunity in our setting are arguably more 
salient than in many real-world settings, our results nevertheless suggest that success is typically 
viewed as a reward for ability and effort, and not as the result of luck. Consequently, people may cling 
to the belief that going from rags to riches is possible given enough effort, allowing meritocratic be-
liefs to prevail despite structurally predetermined unfair outcomes.  
This tendency to uphold meritocratic beliefs also illustrates a potentially dark side of meri-
tocracy. According to our data, successful participants self-servingly opt for lower tax rates because 
they feel entitled to their high income. Their success may, however, also distort their perception of 
others’ meritocratic credentials. The psychological literature suggests that people are more likely re-
member the obstacles they faced than the advantages they had (e.g. Davidai and Gilovich 2016). This 
asymmetry may induce people to attribute others’ failure to a lack of effort and perseverance, and 
this tendency may be particularly pronounced in successful people who have managed to overcome 
the hurdles they faced. In this way, our results suggest that attribution of success solely to personal 
merit may be an important impediment to encouraging greater fairness and equality in socioeco-
nomic outcomes.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Prior Beliefs by Treatment 
 
Notes: The Figure shows prior beliefs about task difficulty, deservingness, and relative performance that we elicited before 
revealing the bonus assignment. All beliefs are measured on a scale from 0 – 100: “Prior Belief, Task Difficulty”: likelihood 
of performing in the hard task in %; “Prior Belief, Deserving Bonus”: deserving the $2-bonus payment in %; “Prior, Belief 
Relative Performance”: perceived number of participants performing the same task with a lower score. *** indicates signif-
icant difference from 50% at the 1% level, two-sided t-test. P-values based on t-tests. 
  
 
27 
Figure 2. Treatment Effect on Beliefs 
 
Notes: The Figure shows the difference between posterior and prior beliefs about task difficulty, deservingness, and perfor-
mance in the two conditions. All beliefs are measured on a scale from 0 – 100: “Prior Belief, Task Difficulty”: likelihood of 
performing in the hard task in %; “Prior Belief, Deserving Bonus”: deserving the $2-bonus payment in %; “Prior Belief, Rel-
ative Performance”: perceived number of participants performing the same task with a lower score. 
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Figure 3. Tax Rate by Treatment and Political Orientation 
a. Treatment effect b. Split by political orientation 
  
Notes: The Figure shows the average tax rate across different conditions. Panel a. displays average tax rates across treat-
ments (hard task and easy task) and panel b. shows the average tax rates across condition split by political orientation. 
Conservatives (solid black line) and liberals (dashed light-gray line). Error bars denote 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 4. Willingness-to-Pay for Information on Task Difficulty 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) for information about the task difficulty 
(using all participants with consistent answers: N=1,776). The grey bars indicate the WTP in the easy task and the overlaying 
rose bars the WTP in the hard task. An amount smaller than $0.01 indicates that the participant always preferred money 
over information and vice versa for an amount larger than $0.50.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Exogenous Task Difficulty (Treatment) 
Difficulty Mean Standard  Deviation 𝑷𝑷𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝑷𝑷𝟓𝟓𝟏𝟏 𝑷𝑷𝟗𝟗𝟏𝟏 
Hard 10.25 5.45 4 10 17 
Easy 34.86 15.47 16 33 56 
Notes: Mean, standard deviation and percentile of correct letter sequences by treatment 
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Table 3.  Regression: Tax Rate and Political Views 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable Tax Rate 
Easy task -39.543*** -39.445*** -39.588*** -39.486*** -36.959*** -36.730*** 
 (1.519) (1.528) (1.513) (1.523) (2.381) (2.409) 
Liberal   5.586*** 5.787*** 7.729*** 8.010*** 
   (1.540) (1.608) (2.535) (2.561) 
Liberal x Easy task     -4.276 -4.476 
     (3.082) (3.108) 
Constant 60.165*** 72.095*** 56.753*** 67.010*** 55.445*** 66.226*** 
 (1.237) (11.360) (1.560) (11.43) (1.994) (11.454) 
Observations 1,825 1,822 1,825 1,822 1,825 1,822 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.272 0.277 0.277 0.282 0.278 0.283 
Notes: OLS-Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. “Tax Rate” is the redistribution rate of the $2-bonus 
payment in percent (0-100). “Easy task” is an indicator for respondents randomly assigned to the easy task. “Liberal” is an 
indicator for respondents who self-identified as strongly liberal, moderately liberal and slightly liberal. Controls include sex, 
age, household size, log income and dummy variables indicating white/European-American ethnicity, college degree, work-
ing, married and U.S.-regions.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
 
33 
 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
  R
eg
re
ss
io
n:
 T
ax
 R
at
e 
an
d 
Be
lie
fs
 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
De
p.
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
Ta
x 
Ra
te
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ea
sy
 ta
sk
 
-3
9.
54
3*
**
 
-3
9.
44
5*
**
 
-4
4.
59
9*
**
 
-2
7.
69
5*
**
 
-1
6.
04
9*
**
 
-6
.8
28
 
3.
19
6 
 
(1
.5
19
) 
(1
.5
28
) 
(3
.7
65
) 
(3
.7
92
) 
(3
.7
51
) 
(4
.3
88
) 
(5
.3
02
) 
Pr
io
r B
el
ie
f, 
Ta
sk
 D
iff
ic
ul
ty
  
 
 
 
0.
17
6*
**
 
 
 
0.
12
3*
*/
# 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
48
) 
 
 
(0
.0
49
) 
Ea
sy
 ta
sk
 x
 P
ri
or
 B
el
ie
f, 
Ta
sk
 D
iff
ic
ul
ty
 
 
 
 
-0
.1
71
**
* 
 
 
-0
.0
91
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
57
) 
 
 
(0
.0
59
) 
Pr
io
r B
el
ie
f, 
Re
la
tiv
e 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
  
 
 
 
 
0.
25
6*
**
 
 
0.
12
6*
* 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
51
) 
 
(0
.0
64
) 
Ea
sy
 ta
sk
 x
 P
ri
or
 B
el
ie
f, 
Re
la
tiv
e 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.4
44
**
* 
 
-0
.2
26
**
*/
# 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
65
) 
 
(0
.0
79
) 
Pr
io
r B
el
ie
f, 
D
es
er
vi
ng
 B
on
us
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.
22
8*
**
 
0.
14
3*
**
/#
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
42
) 
(0
.0
53
) 
Ea
sy
 ta
sk
 x
 P
ri
or
 B
el
ie
f, 
D
es
er
vi
ng
 B
on
us
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.4
44
**
* 
-0
.3
19
**
*/
# 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
56
) 
(0
.0
69
) 
Ef
fo
rt
 D
et
er
m
in
es
 S
uc
ce
ss
 
 
 
-0
.2
19
**
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
39
) 
 
 
 
 
Ea
sy
 ta
sk
 x
 E
ffo
rt
 D
et
er
m
in
es
 S
uc
ce
ss
 
 
 
0.
12
5*
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
55
) 
 
 
 
 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
60
.1
65
**
* 
72
.0
95
**
* 
81
.6
31
**
* 
60
.4
96
**
* 
57
.0
02
**
* 
51
.0
22
**
* 
42
.7
1*
**
 
 
(1
.2
37
) 
(1
1.
36
0)
 
(1
1.
53
7)
 
(1
1.
69
0)
 
(1
1.
61
8)
 
(1
1.
61
4)
 
(1
1.
91
) 
Ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 
1,
82
5 
1,
82
2 
1,
82
2 
1,
82
2 
1,
82
2 
1,
82
2 
1,
82
2 
Co
nt
ro
ls
 
N
o 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
Ye
s 
R-
sq
ua
re
d 
0.
27
2 
0.
27
7 
0.
29
6 
0.
28
4 
0.
30
3 
0.
29
7 
0.
31
0 
N
ot
es
: O
LS
-R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
w
ith
 ro
bu
st
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s. 
“T
ax
 R
at
e”
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
in
 p
er
ce
nt
 (0
-1
00
 p
er
ce
nt
). 
“E
as
y 
ta
sk
” i
s a
n 
in
di
ca
to
r f
or
 ra
nd
om
 a
ss
ig
nm
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ea
sy
 ta
sk
. P
ri
or
 b
el
ie
fs
 e
lic
ite
d 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
bo
nu
s 
as
si
gn
m
en
t a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
d 
on
 a
 s
ca
le
 fr
om
 0
 –
 1
00
: “
Pr
io
r B
el
ie
f, 
Ta
sk
 D
iff
ic
ul
ty
”: 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
of
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
in
 th
e 
ha
rd
 
ta
sk
 in
 %
; “
Pr
io
r 
Be
lie
f, 
De
se
rv
in
g 
Bo
nu
s”
: d
es
er
vi
ng
 th
e 
$2
-b
on
us
 p
ay
m
en
t i
n 
%
; “
Pr
io
r 
Be
lie
f, 
Re
la
tiv
e 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
”: 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ta
sk
 w
ith
 a
 lo
w
er
 s
co
re
; “
Ef
fo
rt
 D
et
er
m
in
es
 S
uc
ce
ss
”: 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
th
at
 th
e 
$2
-b
on
us
 p
ay
m
en
t d
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
he
r e
xe
rt
ed
 e
ffo
rt
 in
 %
. C
on
tr
ol
s 
in
cl
ud
e 
se
x,
 a
ge
, h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
si
ze
, l
og
 in
co
m
e 
an
d 
a 
se
t o
f i
nd
ic
at
or
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 fo
r 
w
hi
te
/E
ur
op
ea
n-
Am
er
ic
an
 e
th
ni
ci
ty
, c
ol
le
ge
 d
eg
re
e,
 w
or
ki
ng
, m
ar
ri
ed
 a
nd
 U
.S
.-r
eg
io
ns
 (
No
rt
h,
 E
as
t, 
So
ut
h,
 M
id
w
es
t, 
W
es
t)
.  
**
* p
<0
.0
1,
 **
 p
<0
.0
5,
 * 
p<
0.
1;
 #  
in
di
ca
te
s s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 , w
he
n 
us
in
g 
th
e 
ad
ap
tiv
e 
lin
ea
r s
te
p-
up
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 b
y 
(B
en
ja
m
in
i, 
Kr
ie
ge
r, 
an
d 
Ye
ku
tie
li 
20
06
) t
ha
t c
on
tr
ol
s f
or
 a
 fa
ls
e 
di
sc
ov
er
y 
ra
te
 a
t q
=0
.0
5 
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(6
) 
 
34 
Table 5. Regression: Willingness to Pay for Information 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable WTP 
Easy task -0.991* -1.109** -0.990* -1.109** 
 (0.535) (0.531) (0.534) (0.531) 
Liberal   -0.635 -0.213 
   (0.565) (0.579) 
Constant 7.367*** -0.892 7.760*** -0.697 
 (0.403) (3.832) (0.558) (3.816) 
Observations 1,776 1,773 1,776 1,773 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Interval-Regression, robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes only participants with consistent 
answers, i.e. we dropped 49 participants who switched multiple times between a monetary amount and receiving infor-
mation. “WTP” is the willingness to pay for receiving information about the task difficulty and the score of the other partic-
ipant. The variable is categorized in 9 intervals [0¢,1¢]; [1¢,3¢]; [3¢,5¢]; [5¢,7¢]; [7¢,10¢]; [10¢,20¢]; [20¢,35¢]; [35¢,50¢]; 
[50¢,inf). “Easy task” is an indicator for respondents randomly assigned to the easy task (treatment). “Liberal” is an indicator 
for respondents who self-identified as strongly liberal, moderately liberal and slightly liberal. Controls include sex, age, 
household size, log income and dummy variables indicating white/European-American ethnicity, college degree, working, 
married and U.S.-regions (North, East, South, Midwest, West).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Regression: Revising Tax Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable  Revising Tax Rate=1 Change in Tax Rate 
Received info 0.078** 0.081** 0.009 0.024 3.787*** 3.944*** 4.495 4.782 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.072) (0.072) (1.231) (1.253) (3.376) (3.374) 
Easy task   -0.093 -0.078   -4.617** -4.522** 
   (0.06) (0.06)   (2.087) (2.042) 
Liberal   -0.092* -0.103*   -4.017** -4.455** 
   (0.055) (0.057)   (1.954) (2.003) 
Easy task x   0.051 0.042   2.935 3.211 
Liberal   (0.075) (0.074)   (2.376) (2.326) 
Easy task   0.026 0.001   -1.216 -2.085 
x Received info   (0.098) (0.097)   (3.941) (3.932) 
Liberal x    0.084 0.076   -1.417 -1.225 
Received info   (0.086) (0.086)   (3.599) (3.600) 
Easy task x    0.003 0.026   2.567 3.178 
Liberal x Received info   (0.123) (0.122)   (4.525) (4.519) 
WTP 0.313** 0.278* 0.309** 0.271* 4.032 1.858 2.799 0.716 
 (0.152) (0.149) (0.153) (0.150) (4.829) (4.984) (4.772) (4.889) 
         
Constant 0.285*** 0.609*** 0.374*** 0.676*** 4.647*** 2.170 8.635*** 5.833 
 (0.018) (0.221) (0.045) (0.226) (0.534) (6.809) (1.690) (6.953) 
Observations 1,096 1,094 1,096 1,094 1,096 1,094 1,096 1,094 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.020 0.047 0.027 0.054 0.019 0.035 0.037 0.054 
Notes: OLS-Regression, robust standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes all participants who had the oppor-
tunity to revise their initial tax decision, i.e. these are all participants who received information about the task difficulty and 
a random subset of participants who did not receive this information. “Revising Tax Rate=1” is an indicator for revising the 
initially chosen tax rate and “Change in Tax Rate” is the absolute difference between initial and revised tax rate. “Received 
info” is an indicator for participants who received information about the task difficulty and the performance of the other 
participant. “Easy task” is an indicator for participants randomly assigned to the easy task (treatment) and “Liberal” is an 
indicator for participants who self-identified as strongly liberal, moderately liberal and slightly liberal. “WTP” is the will-
ingness to pay for receiving information about the task difficulty and the score of the other participant. The variable is 
categorized in 9 intervals [0¢,1¢]; [1¢,3¢]; [3¢,5¢]; [5¢,7¢]; [7¢,10¢]; [10¢,20¢]; [20¢,35¢]; [35¢,50¢]; [50¢,inf). Controls in-
clude sex, age, household size, log income and dummy variables indicating white/European-American ethnicity, college 
degree, working, married and U.S.-regions (North, East, South, Midwest, West).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Online Appendix 
Misperceiving Economic Success: Experimental Evidence on 
Meritocratic Beliefs and Inequality Acceptance 
 
Dietmar Fehr and Martin Vollmann 
Heidelberg University 
 
A1. List of Covariates 
• Gender (Male / Female / Other / I prefer not to say) 
• Age (in years) 
• Marital status (Single / Married) 
• Education (Not completed high school/ High school/ Some college/ 2-year college degree/ 
4-year college degree/ Masters degree/ Doctoral degree/ Professional degree (JD, MD)) 
• Ethnicity (White/European-American / Black/African-American / Asian/Asian-Ameri-
can/Pacific Islander / Hispanic/Latino / Other) 
• Number of household members 
• Political beliefs (Strongly liberal / Moderately liberal / Slightly liberal / Slightly conserva-
tive / Moderately conservative / Strongly conservative) 
• Political party identification (Democratic Party/ Republican Party/ Other) 
• US residence (Yes / No) 
• Home state (list of US states) 
• Employment status (Full-time employee / Part-time employee / Self-employed or small 
business owner / Unemployed and looking for work / Student / Not in labor force) 
• Household income ($0 - $9,999 / $10,000 - $14,999 / $15,000 - $19,999 / $20,000 - 
$29,999 / $30,000 - $39,999 / $40,000 - $49,999 / $50,000 - $74,999 / $75,000 - $99,999 
/ $100,000 - $124,999 / $125,000 - $149,999 / $150,000 - $199,999 / $200,000 and more) 
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A2. Locus-of-Control Module  
A person’s locus of control describes the degree to which they feel to have control over the out-
comes in their life. We elicit locus of control (LoC) with a 7-item battery (Cobb-Clark and Schurer 
2013), and summarize the responses in a single measure that ranges between seven (full control 
over life, i.e. internal LoC) and 49 (no control over life, i.e. external LoC). 
a. "I have little control over the things that happen to me.” 
b. "There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have." 
c. "There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life." 
d. "I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life." 
e. "Sometimes I feel that I'm being pushed around in life." 
f. "What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me." 
g. "I can do just about anything I really set my mind to do."  
(7-point scale; Disagree strongly – Agree strongly) 
 
Calculating the combined locus of control index (L-o-C-Index) by summing responses to the five 
external items (a - e), subtracting the sum of responses to the two internal items (f - g) and adding 
16. Specifically,  
𝐿𝐿 − 𝑜𝑜 − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = �𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑝𝑝
𝑗𝑗=𝑎𝑎
−�𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑔𝑔
𝑗𝑗=𝑓𝑓
+ 16 
This index is therefore increasing in external control tendencies and is bounded between 7 (inter-
nal) and 49 (external). 
 
3 
A3. Additional Figures 
 
Figure A1: Relationship between Task Performance and Deservingness of Bonus 
 
Notes: Binned scatterplot showing the relationship between task performance and perceived deservingness of the bo-
nus (Prior-Belief Deserving Bonus). Estimate based on whole sample (N=1,825). 
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A4. Additional Tables 
 
Table A1. Regression: Dropout on Easy Task 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. Variable Dropout Dropout 
Easy task -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.013) (0.009) 
Constant -0.014*** 0.044*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) 
Observations 2,027 1,987 
Controls No No 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 
Notes: (1) OLS-Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. “Easy task” is an indicator for respondents ran-
domly assigned to the easy task (treatment). (2) is the same regression but only considers dropouts after participants 
learned about the bonus assignment. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2. Balance between No-Dropouts and Dropouts 
 No-Dropouts (n=1825) 
Dropouts 
(n = 202)  
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. p-value 
L-o-C-Index 20.95 9.16 21.88 9.94 0.17 
Age (in years)  39.17 12.41 37.65 11.66  0.09 
Female (in %)  52.44 49.95 45.05  49.88  0.05 
White (in %)  76.66 42.31 73.27  44.37  0.28 
Married (in %) 45.21 49.78 41.58 49.41  0.33 
People in Household 2.66 1.42 2.70 1.37 0.72 
Full-Time Employed (in %) 61.37 48.70 67.82 46.83 0.07 
Part-Time Employed (in %) 11.34 31.72 11.39 31.84 0.99 
Self-Employed (in %) 11.12 31.45 8.91 28.56 0.34 
Not-in-Labor-Force (in %) 9.75 29.67 5.94 23.70 0.08 
Income (in $) 64,784 42,589 62,203 40,993 0.41 
Strongly Liberal (in %) 18.14 38.54 15.84 36.60 0.71 
Moderately Liberal (in %) 22.30 41.64 24.75 43.26 0.43 
Slightly Liberal (in %) 21.04 40.77 21.29 41.04 0.94 
Slightly Conservative (in %) 20.27 40.22 19.31 39.57 0.75 
Moderately Conservative (in %) 12.66 33.26 13.86 34.64 0.63 
Strongly Conservative (in %) 5.59 22.98 4.95 21.75 0.38 
Democrats (in %) 52.88 49.93 54.46 49.92 0.67 
Republicans (in %) 28.27 45.05 25.74 43.83 0.45 
No/ Other Political Party (in %) 18.85 39.12 19.80 39.95 0.74 
Northeast Region (in %) 19.04 39.28 21.78 41.38 0.35 
South Region (in %) 38.36 48.64 37.62 48.56 0.84 
Midwest Region (in %) 20.75 40.56 18.81 39.18 0.52 
West Region (in %) 21.84 41.33 21.78 41.38 0.98 
Only High school Degree (in %) 8.98 28.61 7.43 26.28 0.46 
Only Some College (in %) 24.27 42.89 21.29 41.04 0.35 
2-Year College Degree (in %) 12.22 32.76 12.38 33.01 0.95 
4-Year College Degree (in %) 38.36 48.64 37.38 45.05 0.06 
Master Degree (in %) 12.22 32.76 11.39 31.84 0.73 
Doctoral/ Professional Degree  
(in %) 
3.67 18.81 1.98 13.97 0.22 
Notes: The L-o-C-Index is a measure for locus of control (for details see main text or Appendix). The last column presents 
p-values from separate OLS regressions of the form 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽0 ∗ 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , where 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  is a treatment indicator. 
The F-statistic from a joint significance test of all covariates is 0.83 (p-value =0.727). 
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Table A3. Summary Statistics and Balance between Easy and Hard task 
 All (n=1825) Hard task (n = 907) 
Easy task 
(n = 918)  
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. p-value 
L-o-C-Index 20.95 9.16 21.16 9.12 20.74 9.20 0.34 
Age (in years)  39.17 12.41 39.30 12.40  39.04  12.42  0.66 
Female (in %)  52.44 49.95 53.14  49.91  51.74  50.00  0.55 
White (in %)  76.66 42.31 75.74  42.88  77.56  41.74  0.36 
Married (in %) 45.21 49.78 46.97 49.94  43.46  49.60  0.13 
People in Household 2.66 1.42 2.63 1.37 2.69 1.48 0.33 
Full-Time Employed (in %) 61.37 48.70 61.63 48.66 61.11 48.78 0.82 
Part-Time Employed (in %) 11.34 31.72 10.80 31.06 11.87 32.37 0.47 
Self-Employed (in %) 11.12 31.45 12.57 33.17 9.69 29.61 0.05 
Not-in-Labor-Force (in %) 9.75 29.67 9.59 29.46 9.91 29.90 0.82 
Income (in $) 64,784 42,589 64,388 41,709 65,089 43,241 0.73 
Strongly Liberal (in %) 18.14 38.54 17.64 38.14 18.63 38.95 0.58 
Moderately Liberal (in %) 22.30 41.64 21.50 41.10 23.09 42.17 0.41 
Slightly Liberal (in %) 21.04 40.77 21.94 41.41 20.15 40.14 0.35 
Slightly Conservative (in %) 20.27 40.22 19.96 39.99 20.59 40.46 0.74 
Moderately Conservative (in %) 12.66 33.26 12.90 33.54 12.42 33.00 0.76 
Strongly Conservative (in %) 5.59 22.98 6.06 23.88 5.12 22.05 0.38 
Democrats (in %) 52.88 49.93 52.70 49.95 53.05 49.93 0.88 
Republicans (in %) 28.27 45.05 28.34 45.09 28.21 45.03 0.95 
No/ Other Political Party (in %) 18.85 39.12 18.96 39.22 18.74 39.04 0.90 
Northeast Region (in %) 19.04 39.28 20.40 40.32 17.65 38.14 0.13 
South Region (in %) 38.36 48.64 38.04 48.57 38.56 48.70 0.82 
Midwest Region (in %) 20.75 40.56 20.18 40.15 21.24 40.92 0.57 
West Region (in %) 21.84 41.33 21.28 40.95 22.33 41.67 0.59 
Only High school Degree (in %) 8.98 28.61 9.59 28.61 8.39 27.74 0.37 
Only Some College (in %) 24.27 42.89 23.70 42.55 24.84 43.23 0.57 
2-Year College Degree (in %) 12.22 32.76 12.90 33.53 11.55 31.98 0.38 
4-Year College Degree (in %) 38.36 48.64 37.38 48.41 39.32 48.87 0.39 
Master Degree (in %) 12.22 32.76 12.23 32.79 12.20 32.75 0.98 
Doctoral/ Professional Degree  
(in %) 
3.67 18.81 4.19 20.04 3.16 17.50 0.24 
Notes: The L-o-C-Index is a measure for locus of control (for details see main text or Appendix). The last column presents 
p-values from separate OLS regressions of the form 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽0 ∗ 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , where 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  is a treatment indicator. 
The F-statistic from a joint significance test of all covariates is 1.09 (p-value =0.348). 
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Table A4. Comparison between Selected Experiment Demographics and U.S. Population 
Variables Experiment U.S. Population 
Median Age (in years)  36.0 38.2 
Female (in %)  52.4 50.8 
White (in %)  76.7 60.4 
Married (in %) 45.21 49.78 
People in Household 2.66 2.52 
Median Household Income (in $) 62,500 61,937 
Bachelor’s degree or higher (in %) 68.7 32.6 
Northeast Region (in %) 19.0 17.1 
Midwest Region (in %) 20.8 20.8 
West Region (in %) 21.8 23.9 
South Region (in %) 38.4 38.4 
Notes: The U.S. Population data was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau: Median age (2018)1, Female (2019)2,  White 
(not Hispanic or Latino)(2018)3, Married (2018)4, People in Household (2019)5, Median Household Income (2018)6 , 
Bachelor’s degree or higher (25 years age or over)(2018)7, Region (Northeast, Midwest, West, South)(2019)8 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
1https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=female&tid=ACSST1Y2018.S0101&vintage=2018&hidePre-
view=true(03.04.2020) 
2 https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/LFE046218 (03.04.2020) 
3 https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/LFE046218 (03.04.2020) 
4https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=S1201%3A%20MARITAL%20STATUS&tid=ACSST1Y2018.S1201&vin-
tage=2018&hidePreview=true (03.04.2020) 
5 https://www.statista.com/statistics/183648/average-size-of-households-in-the-us/ (03.04.2020) 
6https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=median%20income&tid=ACSST1Y2018.S1903&t=Income%20%28House-
holds,%20Families,%20Individuals%29&hidePreview=true&vintage=2018 (03.04.2020) 
7 https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=education&tid=ACSST1Y2018.S1501&t=Education&vin-
tage=2018&hidePreview=true (03.04.2020) 
8 https://www.census.gov/popclock/data_tables.php?component=growth (03.04.2020) 
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A5. IV-Estimates: Effect of the treatment on the treated 
We identify the causal impact of economic success on meritocratic beliefs and redistributive taxes 
through the random assignment of participants to the easy and hard task. Recall that we calibrated 
the two tasks such that completing the easy task results in a better performance than completing 
the hard task. Consequently, economic success should coincide with the random task assignment.  
Because treatment compliance was imperfect, we reported the intention-to-treat (ITT) ef-
fects in the paper. In the following we present the effects of treatment on treated (i.e. the effect of 
receiving the bonus – economic success – on meritocratic beliefs and redistributive taxes) by us-
ing our random assignment to the two tasks as an instrument. In specifications that include an 
interaction term between economic success and political view, we also instrument the interaction 
term with the interaction between task assignment and political view. Non-compliance was about 
6 percent and the magnitude of the ITT estimates reported in the paper is similar to the IV esti-
mates presented here.  
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Table A7.  IV-Regression: Tax Rate and Political Views 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable Tax Rate 
Liberal 5.540*** 5.425*** 8.064*** 8.169*** 
 (1.490) (1.543) (2.597) (2.612) 
Economic Success -44.52*** -44.45*** -41.44*** -41.08*** 
 (1.645) (1.651) (2.581) (2.604) 
Liberal x Economic Success   -5.016 -5.492 
   (3.347) (3.366) 
Constant 59.33*** 66.23*** 57.79*** 64.97*** 
 (1.570) (11.52) (2.042) (11.54) 
F-statistic first stage 6891.64 6891.64 7645.23 7645.23 
Observations 1,825 1,822 1,825 1,822 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.323 0.328 0.323 0.328 
Notes: Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. “Tax Rate” is the redis-
tribution rate of the $2-bonus payment in percent (0-100 percent). “Liberal” is an indicator for respondents who self-
identified as strongly liberal, moderately liberal and slightly liberal. “Economic Success” is an indicator for the bonus 
payment and is instrumented by “Easy task” an indicator for respondents being randomly assigned to the easy task 
(treatment). Controls include sex, age, household size, log income and dummy variables indicating white/European-
American ethnicity, college degree, working, married and U.S.-regions (North, East, South, Midwest, West). In columns 
(1) and (2) we report the F-statistic of “Economic Success” instrumented by “Easy task”; in columns (3) and (4) we 
report the F-Statistics of “ Liberal x Economic Success ” instrumented by “Liberal x Easy task”. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A6. Locus-of-Control: Estimates  
 
 
 
 
Table A8. Regression: Locus of Control Index on Liberal 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. Variables L-o-C-Index 
Liberal 1.308*** 1.084** 
 (0.438) (0.443) 
Constant 20.145*** 49.977*** 
 (0.341) (3.370) 
Observations 1,825 1,822 
Controls No Yes 
R-squared 0.005 0.073 
Notes: OLS-Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. “L-o-C-Index” is bounded between 7 (internal) and 
49 (external). “Liberal” is an indicator for respondents who self-identified as strongly liberal, moderately liberal and 
slightly liberal. Controls include sex, age, household size, log income and dummy variables indicating white/European-
American ethnicity, college degree, working, married and U.S.-regions (North, East, South, Midwest, West).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A9. Regression: Tax Rate and Locus-of-Control Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable Tax Rate 
L-o-C-Index 0.060 0.061 -0.035 -0.033 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.139) (0.141) 
Easy task -39.518*** -39.416*** -43.455*** -43.330*** 
 (1.521) (1.531) (3.884) (3.888) 
L-o-C-Index x Easy task   0.188 0.187 
   (0.170) (0.170) 
Constant 58.889*** 68.990*** 60.906*** 70.322*** 
 (2.202) (12.242) (3.244) (12.350) 
Observations 1,825 1,822 1,825 1,822 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.277 0.272 0.273 0.277 
Notes: OLS-Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. “Tax Rate” is the redistribution rate of the $2-bonus 
payment in percent (0-100 percent).  “L-o-C-Index” is bounded between 7 (internal) and 49 (external).  “Easy task” is 
an indicator for respondents randomly assigned to the easy task (treatment). Controls include sex, age, household size, 
log income and dummy variables indicating white/European-American ethnicity, college degree, working, married and 
U.S.-regions.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A10. Regression: Change in Beliefs (Posterior – Prior) and Locus-of-Control Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep.  
Variable 
Δ - Belief Task Dif-
ficulty 
Δ-Belief Deserving Bo-
nus 
Δ - Belief Relative 
Performance 
Effort Determines  
Success 
L-o-C-Index -0.046 -0.032 0.086 0.076 -0.122* -0.121* -0.289** -0.260** 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.078) (0.079) (0.067) (0.0694) (0.121) (0.123) 
Easy task -0.457 -0.813 10.261*** 10.152*** 6.661*** 6.701*** 16.866*** 16.681*** 
 (2.311) (2.320) (2.198) (2.179) (1.838) (1.839) (3.489) (3.492) 
L-o-C-Index x  -0.047 -0.028 0.0346 0.0316 0.174** 0.169** -0.037 -0.015 
Easy task (0.105) (0.104) (0.098) (0.098) (0.084) (0.085) (0.154) (0.155) 
Constant 4.515*** -10.782 -7.622*** -13.112* -1.651 1.632 60.165*** 50.286*** 
 (1.644) (7.905) (1.789) (7.695) (1.435) (6.657) (2.799) (11.016) 
Observations 1,825 1,822 1,825 1,822 1,825 1,822 1,825 1,822 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.002 0.010 0.080 0.086 0.106 0.113 0.082 0.093 
Notes: OLS-Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. “Δ” is the difference between posterior and prior 
beliefs. The beliefs are elicited before the bonus assignment (prior) and after the bonus assignment (posterior). All 
beliefs are measured on a scale from 0 – 100: “Belief Task Difficulty”: likelihood of performing in the hard task in %; 
“Belief Deserving Bonus”: deserving the $2-bonus payment in %; “Belief Relative Performance”: perceived number of 
participants performing the same task with a lower score; “Effort Determines Success”: likelihood that the $2-bonus 
payment depends on her exerted effort in %. “Easy task” is an indicator for random assignment to the easy task. “Liberal” 
is an indicator for respondents who self-identified as strongly liberal, moderately liberal and slightly liberal. Controls 
include sex, age, household size, log income and a set of indicator variables for white/European-American ethnicity, 
college degree, working, married and U.S.-regions (North, East, South, Midwest, West).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A11. Regression: Willingness to Pay and Locus-of-Control Index 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable WTP Revised Tax Rate 
L-o-C-Index 0.022 0.045 -0.103 -0.063 -0.176 -0.114 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.176) (0.178) (0.242) (0.248) 
Easy task -0.801 -0.916 -49.037*** -48.991*** -51.08*** -50.594*** 
 (1.281) (1.268) (4.924) (4.949) (6.468) (6.524) 
L-o-C-Index  -0.009 -0.008 0.381* 0.382* 0.493* 0.476 
x Easy task (0.057) (0.056) (0.219) (0.220) (0.294) (0.296) 
Receive Info     2.321 3.365 
     (8.112) (8.123) 
L-o-C- Index      0.115 0.0560 
x Receive Info     (0.352) (0.354) 
Receive Info      6.227 5.291 
x Easy task     (10.02) (10.02) 
L-o-C-Index x Receive      -0.266 -0.234 
Info x Easy task     (0.443) (0.442) 
Constant 6.911*** -3.034 65.819*** 59.377*** 65.135*** 60.008*** 
 (0.971) (4.173) (4.039) (16.721) (5.416) (17.260) 
Observations 1,776 1,773 1,130 1,128 1,130 1,128 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R-squared   0.284 0.295 0.289 0.299 
Notes: (1) - (2) is an Interval-Regression and (3) - (6) an OLS-Regression, robust standard errors in parentheses. “WTP” 
is the willingness to pay for seeing information about the task difficulty and score of the other participant or receiving 
extra money. The variable is categorized in 9 intervals [0¢,1¢]; [1¢,3¢]; [3¢,5¢]; [5¢,7¢]; [7¢,10¢]; [10¢,20¢]; [20¢,35¢]; 
[35¢,50¢]; [50¢,inf). We dropped 49 participants with multiple switching points, since they could not be assigned to a 
category. “Revised Tax Rate” is the redistribution rate of the $2-bonus payment in percent (0-100 percent) after par-
ticipants decide to receive or not receive additional information about their assigned treatment. All participants who 
received the information and half of the participants who did not receive the additional information could revise their 
previous tax rate. “L-o-C-Index” is bounded between 7 (internal) and 49 (external).   “Easy task” is an indicator for 
respondents randomly assigned to the easy task (treatment). “Receive Info” indicates a dummy variable for having 
received information about the task difficulty and the performance of the other participant. Controls include sex, age, 
household size, log income and dummy variables indicating white/European-American ethnicity, college degree, work-
ing, married and U.S.-regions (North, East, South, Midwest, West).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A7. Screenshots of Survey and Experimental Tasks 
 
Bot Control-Question 
 
 
End of Experiment (if Bot Control-Question wrong) 
 
 
General Instructions 
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Locus-of-Control Questionnaire 
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Demographic Questionnaire 
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Description Real Effort Task 
 
 
Description Experiment Payment 
 
 
Hard Real Effort Task 
 
 
Easy Real Effort Task 
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Information Real Effort Task Finished 
 
Prior-Belief about Task Difficulty 
 
Prior- Belief about Deserving the Bonus  
 
Prior-Belief about Relative Performance 
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Instructions about Matching Mechanism 
 
Waiting Room 
 
Information about Bonus Assignment (Bonus) 
 
Information about Bonus Assignment (No Bonus) 
 
Information about Bonus Assignment (Bonus shared if equal performance) 
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Posterior-Belief about Task Difficulty 
 
Posterior-Belief about Deserving the Bonus  
 
Posterior-Belief about Relative Performance 
 
Belief about Bonus Depending on Effort 
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Information about Redistribution Mechanism 
 
Redistribution First Time 
 
Information about Price List to Receive additional Information about Partner 
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Price List to Receive additional Information about Partner 
 
Result of Price List Decisions (see Information) 
 
Result of Price List Decisions (receive Money) 
 
 
26 
Redistribution Second Time 
 
Payment Summary 
 
Information if Participants run into Timeout 
 
 
